Buy back contracts have long been used as the most important form of contract in Iran's oil and gas industry. Over time, with the identification of gaps and shortcomings in this contract and due to the political and economic conditions created, and according to the Law on Duties and Powers of the Ministry of Oil, a new contract format called IPC was designed and introduced. In this research, by adapting and comparing these two contractual formats regarding four factors: financial system, the presence of the contractor in the stages of exploration, development, production, technology transfer and the obligation to use the internal share to find the differences between these two contracts in the mentioned cases. The results of the study show that IPC contracts are more focused than cross-selling contracts on the issue of the requirement to transfer technology and use the internal share by the foreign contractor. The possibility of the contractor to be present in all three stages of exploration, development and production is provided simultaneously, and incentives and incentives are considered in the costs and wages of the contracting party.

The gas shortage in the winter of 2020, as well as the supply-demand mismatch in the coming years, will require investment in gas field development along with demand-side management policies. The National Iranian Oil Company's internal financial resources are insufficient for the development of gas fields due to the company's low share of oil and gas sales profits, and it requires to attract investors through risky service contracts. The high capital cost of developing particular fields, including the low richness-low condensate-of the produced gas, prevents complete repayment from exported condensate, especially in the case of sanctions with a 50% cost recovery cap. Consequently, IPC contract modeling was used to examine five major parameters affecting the gas field development economy: capital cost, quality of gas produced, condensate rice, cost recovery cap, and natural gas price. The proposed financial relationship is provided by picking the ideal value of the two parameters of the cost recovery and gas price for a combination of three additional factors.

In this Article, two subjects were examined: the legality of involving a joint operating venture in the exploitation operations in the oil sector and; the type of technology required for the transfer and its beneficiary. Upon examination, we found that establishment and engagement of a joint venture in the production of oil was legitimate and had no legal hurdle. We also demonstrated that beneficiaries of the transfer were personnel of both the joint operating venture and of the NIOC. As to the type of technology, our conclusion was that only end product technology used in the production of oil could be the subject of transfer.In reality, however, technology transfer was very limited. It was confined to obsolete operating technology. Several reasons in this respect were suggested, among which the nature of technology employed in the production of oil constitutes a major one i.e. it is knowledge based and mostly composed of skills needed for transforming inputs into outputs; those for expanding capacity (such as management, engineering and procurement) and those necessary for creating new products or processes. Since, neither of these technologies are codifiable, their owners keep them confidential and hence, avoid any technology transfer.

The Iran Petroleum contract (IPC) framework represents a significant shift in Iran's approach to attracting foreign investment in its oil sector while advancing its foreign policy interests. Drawing upon resource nationalism theory, foreign direct investment theory, and economic statecraft theory, this study addresses the central research question: How does the IPC framework aim to balance attracting foreign investment in Iran's oil sector with advancing its foreign policy objectives? Employing a descriptive-analytical approach, the research utilizes qualitative analysis, comparative analysis, and scenario planning to assess the IPC's implications. The findings highlight the IPC's potential to enhance technology transfer, boost oil production capacity, and foster regional cooperation. However, challenges arising from political risks, international sanctions, and domestic opposition must be addressed with targeted policy measures. The study offers recommendations to enhance the IPC's effectiveness, including streamlining bureaucratic processes, offering competitive fiscal terms, strengthening legal frameworks, enhancing transparency, and developing local capabilities. Moreover, aligning the IPC with Iran's foreign policy goals requires diversifying investment partnerships, leveraging the framework for regional cooperation, and integrating it with national development objectives. The insights provided contribute to understanding the complex interplay between contractual frameworks, foreign investment, and strategic interests in Iran's oil sector, informing policymakers, industry stakeholders, and researchers in their decision-making processes. The IPC's successful implementation will be crucial in shaping Iran's economic development and foreign policy trajectory in the years to come.

After nearly three decades since the conclusion and implementation of Buyback contracts in the oil and gas industry in Iran, objections to this contract, particularly from the perspective of foreign investors has been revealed. Failure to allocate a share of the produced oil and gas to foreign investors and subsequently discussing possibility of reserve recognition, short terms of Buybacks and non participation of oil companies in production period, non admissibility of Buybacks fiscal system for foreign investors and the Iranian content are among many challenges which have been set forth by contractors. In order to solve such problems and attract expertise and financial resources to the Iranian oil and gas projects, a new petroleum contract has been introduced by Iran, the so-called Iranian Petroleum contract (IPC). The present article will comparatively analyze Buyback and IPC in three aspects naming ownership, reservoir recognition and fiscal regime and will conclude that under IPC, the same as Buyback, ownership of petroleum in situ and produced oil and gas vest by the government. Also, IPC’ s contractor, the same as the contractor under the Buyback, is able to recognize oil and gas reserves in accordance with the PRMS guideline, and its fiscal regime although in some areas has been improved, some objections can be raised.

This research aims to study lease contract among set of Islamic contracts by explaining the importance and necessity of detailed study about Islamic contracts and contractual approach to Islamic economics. In this regard by considering asymmetric information as the most important challenge facing lease contract, we will study lease contract using contract theory and incentives economics. For this purpose, using a library method we study the various aspects of asymmetry of information in the lease contract considering Islamic economics and we construct a mathematical model to solve the problem. Finally we reach theoretical model that can design optimal contracts for lease of house (by replacing parameters) in a way that adverse selection problem will be solved. Then we use hypothetical parameters to solve the constructed model using LINGO software, for testing the model.

As the first link between the host governments and oil companies, oil contracts arrangements have an important role to risk sharing between contract parties. In this regard, the main objective of this study is to provide a comparative evaluation of the risk factor (Cost Risk, Price Risk, Production Risk) of National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) in Buy-Back (BB), Production Sharing contract (PSC), and Iranian Petroleum contract (IPC), and choosing the best contract based on the risk factor. Based on the results of the Wilcoxon Ranking Test, the average of the NPV of the NIOC in the IPC is more than the other types of contracts. However, the NPV in the IPC does not significantly differ from BB. Other findings revealed that the most risk of rising costs to the NIOC is related to the BB, IPC, and PSC, respectively. In addition, the most risk associated with a reduction in oil production is related to BB, IPC, and PSC, respectively. the most risk associated with the oil price reduction for the NIOC related to the IPC same as BB contracts that greater than PSC.

Fiscal regime governing contracts is one of the main aspects of differences between petroleum contracts with each other. To design a suitable fiscal regime, economic considerations are on the top of priority. Comparing Buy-Back contracts with new Iran Petroleum contract (IPC) shows that Buy-Back contracts have intrinsic problems such as being short term, having a disintegrated chain of production, faulty tax system and having cost based fiscal system. While IPC is long-term contracts with an integrated chain of production and the contractor has an incentive for cost saving (but with the same faulty tax system). On the other hand, comparing the net present value of contractor take shows that IPC could have been more desirable and cost-effective in Azadegan oil field than Buy-Back contracts.

The choice of financial regime in oil-rich countries depends on proven reserves, exploration and production costs, geological characteristics, political risks, and oil market conditions. In this article, contractual components of three contracts IPC, BUYBACK, and PSC are introduced using Visual Basic programming language, and a model structure for a 42-season period scenar-io with oil prices is created. Also, modeling based on the parameters of the Shadegan oil field is another innovation of this work. The aim of this research is to investigate the effective indica-tors in the oil and gas industry contracts based on oil price scenarios. The results of this study show that many of the constraints of the reservoir owner country have been modified in the direction of protecting oil fields and effectively controlling contractor's fees in modified mutual agreement and production sharing contracts, and the financial system of the new oil contracts is more efficient in case of an oil price increase and in the final years of production compared to production sharing and buyback contracts. In this study, comparing indicators such as internal rate of return, payback period, profitability index, and the share of both parties in the contract based on real and simulated data showed that entering into new oil contracts in Iran, especially IPC in the Shadegan oil field, can protect the oil field, prevent uncontrolled oil extraction, and control contractor's revenues, leading to lower costs and higher revenues compared to buyback and production sharing contracts for the host country (Iran).

One of the issues which internationally is important in the oil industry is related to the Upstream industry of oil contracts. Changes made in these contracts consist of differences made directly in relation to the importance of the number of hydrocarbon sources and the number of shares each party is going to gain. If more structure of these contracts is emphasized and fortified, more duties and places of each party will be complicated. In this research, the comparison is made between two contract models which have been recently proposed and overviewed. The criterion used in selected contracts is from the National Iranian south oil company (NISOC) and Iranian Petroleum contracts (IPC). The research has concentrated on the efficient economic cost role used in these contracts. A questionnaire was conducted based on the analytical hierarchy process, and a survey was conducted among the professionals of the oil industry. The results showed that most of those who participated in the survey agreed that the National Iranian South Oil Company’s contract (NISOC) has a better criterion for the efficient role in economic cost